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Abstract 
Support for genetic modification in agriculture mainly stems from approval of food and agricultural goals. It is facili-
tated by trust in the judgment of scientific authorities and undermined by anxiety about the risks involved. But there are 
symptoms of danger: Any public opinion data that show significant correlations between perceptions of fact (risk, trust 
etc.) and background characteristics (age, sex, religion, politics) or goals (environmental, medical, economic) typically 
reflect emotional feedback effects as well as rational scientific ones. Estimates from regression are then biased and 
more complex models required. Our structural equation analyses of five large, representative national surveys of Aus-
tralia (N = 8730) provide precise estimates of the magnitude of these effects, including reciprocal effects reflecting 
emotional influences. The author also finds that: (1) acceptance of the scientific worldview modestly increases support 
both directly and also indirectly through its influence on trust; (2) family socio-economic background increases know-
ledge of genetic engineering but is otherwise inconsequential; and (3) religious belief greatly hinders acceptance of the 
scientific worldview and slightly increases anxiety about risks. 
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Introduction © 
Is it good or bad to make new scientific discoveries 
and implement new technologies? Or does the an-
swer depend upon the context? The moral accepta-
bility of new technologies has stimulated lively, 
sometimes rancorous, debate in Western societies at 
least since ancient Greece: The moral status of those 
who, like Daedalus and Faust, push the limits of 
invention has always been problematic. For exam-
ple, the emergence of the techniques known as ge-
netic modification (GM) or genetic engineering 
raises many questions, among them the question of 
whether it is a good thing for people to delve so 
deeply into the nature of life. Genetic modification 
is a particularly informative biotechnology in which 
to assess public opinion on scientific issues, because 
it is both relatively new and clearly important. 
Hence, most people know about it, and many are 
concerned about it, but public policies are only 
gradually becoming institutionalized.  
Research on public opinion in this area is expanding 
rapidly (Pin and Gutteling, 2009). Reliable assessment 
of public opinion requires carefully designed, rigorous 
sample surveys, as has long been known (Sudman and 
Bradburn, 1974; Pidgeon et. al., 2005). Voluntary 
comments (including the EU’s internet based system: 
Ferretti and Lener, 2008) may placate demands for 
public participation, but the information they provide 
does not accurately represent public opinion. 
This paper provides rigorous structural equation 
estimates of the Australian public’s views based on 
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systematically developed multiple-item scales with 
data from five large, representative national surveys 
with 8730 cases. The models distinguish scientific, 
religious, and emotional/psychological influences 
on attitudes related to genetic modification, estimate 
their magnitudes, and estimate reciprocal effects 
among them. 
The outcome is a cautionary tale: Feedback effects 
are large and ignoring them seriously misleading. 
Section 1 describes Australian opinion on a variety 
of genetically engineered products. The second sec-
tion outlines a model of the determinants of public 
opinion on these issues. Section 3 estimates the 
model and the final concludes. An on-line Appendix 
describes how the variables are measured and gives 
details on data and methods. 
1. Theory and background 
How do people develop attitudes and opinions about 
emerging technologies? Four styles of moral reason-
ing play important roles in opinion formation in 
modern Western societies (Bellah, 1974; Potter, 
1972; Tipton, 1982), although their relative impor-
tance differs among topics.  
1. The deductive mode turns to general principles 
as the wellspring of morally correct action in 
particular situations. For example, if the general 
principle is that taking a life is wrong, deductive 
moral reasoning will find that the death penalty, 
euthanasia, and other particular instances are all 
wrong. Ethics institutions in developed nations 
commonly reason in this way (Sato and Aka-
bayashi, 2005). Prior research has not explored 
the role of the scientific worldview – specifical-
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ly endorsement of the theory of evolution and 
modern astronomy – in shaping moral judg-
ments about genetic modification. But this is an 
important avenue to explore because it may il-
luminate persistent divergence of opinion on 
some topics between scientific elites versus or-
dinary voters and politicians.  
2. The authoritative mode adopts the attitudes and 
opinions of some legitimated moral authority, 
e.g. the Pope, the established church, and poten-
tially other expertise-based elites such as scien-
tists. The authoritative mode also encompasses 
the legitimated cultural momentum of tradition 
and institutions.  
3. The expressive mode judges actions as right or 
wrong according to one’s immediate emotive 
reaction when first confronting a new possibili-
ty– colloquially, the “ugh” factor. Psychologists 
describe moral reasoning in the expressive 
mode as using “affective heuristics” (e.g. Slov-
ic, 1999; and Slovic et. al, 2002). These reac-
tions, of course, may be socially and psycholog-
ically determined. Importantly, explicitly ana-
lyzing the role of the expressive/ affective mode 
allows us to assess the importance of cognitive 
consistency. The other modes of moral reason-
ing all assume a process with perceptions as in-
termediate influences and moral judgment as an 
outcome. But the expressive mode allows influ-
ence both ways: we cannot simply assume that 
perceptions influence moral judgments because 
intuitive moral judgments may also influence 
perceptions. Wishful thinking may lead suppor-
ters of GM to conclude that the risks are small 
and to imagine scientists to be trustworthy when 
they say (as they mostly do) that GM is safe. By 
contrast, intuitive opposition to GM may lead 
others to project their gloomy predispositions by 
seeing risks as large and scientists as untrust-
worthy.  
4. Finally, the consequential mode involves assess-
ing the rights and wrongs of actions by their re-
sults: Actions are judged as means to ends ra-
ther than as ends in themselves. This is, of 
course, Weber’s instrumental rationality (We-
ber, 1947) and is embodied in cost-benefit ana-
lyses, in self-interest calculations, and other ap-
proaches that emphasize the goals or values 
served by the technology rather than its intrinsic 
moral value. Although consequentialist reason-
ing plays only a small role in shaping moral 
judgments about many moral issues, I will sug-
gest that it plays a large role in shaping views 
about technology (especially biotechnology and 
medicine, with their clear implications for hu-
man well-being) and, by generalization, about 
political institutions, procedural justice, and 
other intrinsically neutral mechanisms that have 
morally important outcomes (e.g. Evans and 
Kelley, 2011, 2014; Zerbe, 2007). People eva-
luate the goals the new technology might serve1 
and the risks it might pose. If the goals seem to 
them good and the dangers small, they approve 
it. Alternatively, if they do not greatly value the 
goals, or if they see huge risks, they disapprove 
of the technology.  
With sufficiently intense value commitments to the 
goals, it may be that we need to allow reciprocal 
causation within the consequentialist mode as well 
as in the expressive mode. We need to evaluate em-
pirically the possibility that people’s choice of goals 
also shape their perceptions of the world. It may not 
be just that people rationally evaluate what is and is 
not feasible and choose the path that maximizes 
their utility (as assumed in much prior research us-
ing this theoretical model, especially by econo-
mists). In addition their choice of goals may in turn 
shape their perceptions of what is and is not feasi-
ble: they want something and therefore imagine it 
feasible and safe to get it. In short: feedback, reci-
procal causation. 
This paper evaluates many of these possibilities 
quantitatively, based on structural equation analysis 
of on five large, representative national sample sur-
veys (N = 8730) in Australia. 
The setting. In evaluating genetic modification, the 
citizenry in Europe and the United States seem to be 
taking different paths (Frewer et al., 2013). Public 
opinion on GM differs greatly among countries, as 
shown by the large and closely comparable Euroba-
rometer surveys (Lemkow, 1993, pp. 10-14; Schibe-
ci et al., 1994, p. 20-21; Gaskell et al., 1999)2. Sup-
port for genetic engineering is higher in the USA 
than in Europe (reinforced by differences in regula-
tory philosophy: Zerbe, 2007), and is declining in 
Europe, while the direction of change in the US and 
other English-speaking countries is unclear (Gaskell 
et al., 1999, 2000, 2003; Shanahan, Scheufele and 
Lee, 2001; Priest, 2000).  
Australia falls in between these two extremes. In 
many areas of public policy, Australia is similar to 
Britain, the USA and other English-speaking coun-
tries, but in others it is closer to Scandinavia and 
other Northern European nations (Evans and Kelley 
                                                     
1 Who receives potential benefits is also relevant to the public, generally 
with less support for benefits going to big business and more for bene-
fits going to favored groups (e.g. farmers, poor people) and favored 
causes (e.g. the environment; Norton and Wood, 1998). 
2 Australian surveys up to the mid-1990s are concisely reviewed and 
unpersuasively traduced in Davison, Barns and Schibeci (1997). 
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2004). Moreover, it is a small, open economy with 
important agricultural exports exposed to heavy 
world-wide competition, so genetically modified 
organisms (GMOs) in agriculture are very salient. 
To explore Australian opinion, we included a mod-
ule on attitudes towards genetic engineering in five 
surveys between 1994 and 2002 as part of the Inter-
national Social Science Survey/Australia (IsssA), 
Australia’s leading academic survey.1 The module 
began by asking people to rate a series of goals for 
Australian scientists, to get a general assessment of 
the desirability of different goals. We then intro-
duced the concept of genetic engineering, and asked 
respondents to rate the desirability of a set of specif-
ic potential uses of genetic engineering2. We then 
asked people about their understanding of genetic 
engineering.  
Measurement details and basic results have been 
reported elsewhere (Kelley, 1995, 2003) and are 
briefly recapitulated in the on-line Appendix which 
is freely available at www.international-survey.org. 
This paper presents new results on variables not 
described previously, new models, new structural 
equation estimates involving them, and new conclu-
sions flowing from the analysis. 
2. Data and methods 
2.1. Data. This report is based on five rounds of the 
International Social Science Survey/Australia (IsssA), 
conducted from 1994 through 2002 which are de-
scribed in detail in: Kelley and Evans (1999), Evans 
and Kelley (2004), pp. 317-326. The IsssA surveys 
are from simple random samples of Australian citi-
zens drawn by the Electoral Commission from the 
compulsory electoral roll. They are conducted by 
mail using a modification of Dillman’s (1993) Total 
Response Method. Completion rates run around 60 to 
65%, which compares favorably with recent expe-
rience in Australia, the USA, and many other indus-
trial nations. Previous analyses suggest they are rep-
resentative of the population (Bean, 1991; Evans and 
Kelley, 2002, 2004; Sikora, 1997). There are 8730 
cases in the surveys analyzed here. 
2.2. Methods. Effects are estimated by structural 
equation (SEM or LISREL) methods (Bollen, 1989; 
Joreskog and Sorbom, 1993), as implemented in the 
AMOS program (which is now part of SPSS). As 
                                                     
1 Changes over time are small but complex (as in the USA: Shanahan, 
Scheufele and Lee, 2001) and I deal with them in a separate publication 
(2003), drawing especially on the panel component of the surveys. 
2We also asked about the desirability of labelling genetically engineered 
products; about how much people worry about some potential risks of 
genetic engineering; whether they expect that they themselves would 
use genetically engineered products; and asked for a global evaluation 
of whether the benefits of genetic engineering are likely to outweigh the 
risks. These issues are the focus of separate publications. 
well as allowing the estimation of reciprocal effects, 
these methods correct for attenuation due to random 
measurement error (which is important: Bollen, 
1989; Fan, 2003; Kelley, 1973). For single items we 
use the reliabilities shown in the last row of on-line 
Appendix Table A; reliabilities for multiple item 
scales are estimated in the (full information, maxi-
mum likelihood) model. Alternative estimates are 
by ordinary least squares regression. Since the IsssA 
data are simple random samples, no adjustment for 
sample clustering is required. 
We omit effects too small to make much practical 
difference, specifically those under .10 (standar-
dized) in magnitude. They might well be artifacts of 
the usual minor uncertainties of measurement and 
model specification. Given the large sample size, 
smaller effects are often statistically significant, 
even if unimportant. Sensitivity analysis shows that 
the conclusions are robust – we estimated alterna-
tive structural equation models with all possible 
influences included, however small, and also a third 
model estimated by OLS with no correction for 
attenuation. While it is well known in the measure-
ment literature that OLS estimates are biased, often 
seriously, in the present case the differences are 
small3. 
Details are in the on-line Appendix (www.inter-
national-survey.org). 
2.3. The structure of opinion on genetically mod-
ified products. 2.3.1. Measurement. Because genet-
ic engineering was new and unfamiliar when this 
series of surveys started in 1994, we adopted a mul-
tiple indicator strategy of asking about a large num-
ber of particular, concrete instances (Frewer, How-
ard and Shepherd, 1997). We gave a lengthy intro-
duction, as a reminder to people already familiar 
with genetic engineering and an explanation for 
those previously unacquainted with it.  
The eight particular instances were already well into 
development in Australia and other countries (Aus-
tralian Science and Technology Council, 1993; 
Gaskell et al., 1999): treatments for cancer and high 
blood pressure, pesticides for cotton and other 
crops, viruses to control insect pests, leaner pork, 
healthier cooking oil, and fresher tomatoes. Word-
ing is in the on-line appendix (at www.international-
survey.org). 
People had clear opinions on these questions: only 
2% declined to answer, on the average. That is lo-
wer than average for the questionnaire and well 
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important difference is that OLS greatly underestimates the importance 
of support for medical research in legitimating genetic engineering. 
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below the levels of missing data usual for obscure 
topics1. The low level of missing data and the high 
inter-item correlations (shown in the on-line Appen-
dix) suggest that real public opinion on the topic 
exists; evidence from other nations and using other 
methods concurs (e.g. Connorand Siegrist, 2013). 
2.3.2. Attitude structure. The public might well not 
have coherent attitudes about genetic engineering, if 
only because it is so new, especially when this series 
of surveys began in 1994. However, people often do 
form opinions on the basis of very limited know-
ledge – for example, about the economics of globa-
lization – so novelty does not imply incoherence. To 
assess this issue empirically, the preferred procedure 
is to ask a substantial number of separate questions 
and then investigate the links (or lack of them) 
among the answers (e.g. Judd and Milburn, 1980). 
For example, to discover what voters think about 
government regulation of the economy, best practice 
is to ask many specific questions about regulation in 
particular industries (railways, steel, farms, universi-
ties, hospitals etc.) and then investigate the structure 
of responses (Sikora, 2000). This is the strategy we 
followed. If people have no clear views, their an-
swers to different questions will be uncorrelated 
(and measurement reliability will be zero). But if 
they have well-defined views correlations positive, 
typically in the range of .20 to .60, and factor analy-
sis will find a single factor.  
The results clearly show that the Australian public 
has well-formed attitudes about genetic engineering: 
people who favor one GM product tend strongly to 
favor all of them, and conversely those who are 
leery of one tend to be dubious about all (correla-
tions shown in the on-line Appendix). The correla-
tions average a substantial .51 and the factor analy-
sis shows a strong general factor. For comparison, 
correlations average .31 among items measuring 
attitudes toward government regulation, .42 among 
price control items, .61 among trade union ques-
tions, and .60 among abortion attitudes, so attitudes 
to GM are well within the normal range for Austral-
ian political and economic attitudes (Evans and Kel-
ley, 2002, 2004; Sikora, 2000).  
A second key line of evidence is the test-retest re-
liability (e.g. Wilkinson and American Psychologi-
cal Association Task Force on Statistical Inference, 
1999). If people lack well-defined views, their an-
swers at different times will be uncorrelated, but the 
more clear and stable the attitude, the higher the 
correlation among the answers. Test-retest reliabili-
ties for the GM questions average r = .44, over a 3-
                                                     
1 For example, in another survey we asked people to rate the Chinese 
leader of the day and 25% declined to answer the question. 
year period for just over 3000 panel cases. This is 
somewhat lower than most social and religious atti-
tude items in our surveys, typically r = .55 to r = 
.65, but much the same as formany public policy 
issues in the US over 4 years in the National Elec-
tion Studies (Krosnick, 1991: Tables 1 and 3)2. 
2.3.3. Levels of support. Public support for GM 
differs among products. It is overwhelming for med-
ical uses, high for agricultural non-food uses, and 
least for GM foods3,similar result emerge in Europe, 
the USA, and other nations (Gaskell and Allum, 
2003; Millward-Brown, 2003; Priest, 2000; Shana-
han, Scheufele, and Lee, 2001). See the on-line Ap-
pendix for details. 
2.4. Knowledge and support for genetic enginee-
ring. The public’s limited knowledge of genetic engi-
neering worries many researchers, who wonder 
whether ill-informed citizens can have well-formed 
views about genetic engineering. But a large majority 
of Australians, 73%, say they have “heard much about 
genetic engineering” and almost as many claim to 
have “a basic understanding” of it. So, in fact, there is 
at least a modest level of comprehension. Moreover, 
voters routinely make decisions about policies about 
which they lack sophistication, including abstruse 
issues of economic and environmental policy. 
Importantly, even those who know little about ge-
netic engineering have reasonably coherent attitudes 
about it (see Table 2 in the on-line Appendix). Cor-
relations among their answers are well within the 
normal range (averaging r = .44), although lower 
than correlations for more knowledgeable respon-
dents (averaging r = .53). The reliability of the scale 
used in subsequent analyses is quite satisfactory for 
less knowledgeable respondents, as it is for the more 
knowledgeable. 
Knowledge of GM does not lead to greater support. 
If anything, the more knowledgeable are slightly 
less supportive (Table 2 in the on-line Appendix).  
2.5. Changes over time. Support for GM products 
has declined slowly over our eight-year period. In 
this Australia resembles Europe, not the USA 
(Gaskell et al., 1999, 2000, 2002; Singer et al., 
2008). This decline is small but statistically signifi-
cant (t = -10.69, p < .001), controlling by regression 
                                                     
2 Test-retest correlations measure the joint effect of measurement relia-
bility and over-time stability, thus they understate measurement reliabil-
ity unless there is complete stability over time. Given the rapid and 
controversial changes in genetics, there is likely to be more genuine 
change over time than in most other social and political domains; thus 
test-retest correlations will understate measurement reliability. That the 
scale's alpha reliability is considerably higher than its test-retest correla-
tion also suggests instability over time. 
3 Similar results have been found in other Australian surveys (Norton 
and Wood, 1998; Millward-Brown, 2002, 2003). 
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for everything else in our model. Concretely, the 
decline comes to about 7 points (out of 100) per 
decade. Even at its lowest point, at the end of our 
period, the vast majority remain in favor, averaging 
71 points out of 100. But if the decline were to con-
tinue at this rate (a very arguable assumption), then 
GM products would lose majority support in Aus-
tralia sometime around 2030. 
2.6. Sources of support and opposition: theoreti-
cal orientation. Why do some people support ge-
netically modified products and others oppose 
them? I build on previous models (Besley and Sha-
nahan, 2005; Ho, Brossard et al., 2008; Peters, Lang 
et al., 2007) especially those emphasizing on bene-
fits and costs (e.g. Owen and Louviere, 2005). But I 
extend prior theory to include novel elements: the 
scientific worldview, psychological elements, and 
the possibility of reciprocal causation (see Figure 1). 
The conventional view set out in Figure 1 Panel A – 
widely held in science, economics and by policy 
analysts – is that people have well-defined goals and 
preferences, possibly reflecting in part their back-
ground and religion. Facts about the world are ob-
jective and universal, and can be discovered by 
science and analysis. People choose their actions in 
light of their goals and their understanding of the 
facts about the world, choosing in a way that they 
hope maximizes their chance of getting what they 
want (full arrows in the diagram). This is rational 
and scientific. 
Goals
Background 
and religion
Policy 
preferences
Perceptions of
fact (trust, risk)
Knowledge
Goals
Background
and religion
Policy 
preferences
Perceptions of
fact (trust, risk)
Legend
Knowledge
Theory A: (Science, rational choice, economics, policy analysis) Facts are objective, 
universal. Thus the paths not shown are zero. Causal order is from left to right.
Theory B: (Psychology) In addition to scientific/rational considerations, perceived 
facts are malleable, adjusted to be more consistent with one's own goals, policy 
preferences, and sometimes religious or political beliefs. 
                Red dash-dot: Psychological, not rational
                Green solid: Rational, scientific
 
Fig. 1. Theoretical orientation 
But there are also irrational, emotional and psycho-
logical possibilities in addition to rational, scientific 
ones (Figure 1, Panel B). Perceived facts may be 
malleable, adjustable to be more consistent with 
one’s own goals, policy preferences, religious and 
political beliefs (red dash-dot arrows in the diagram). 
Religion may shape how people perceive the facts 
about the world; people may see the world as more 
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compatible with their goals and policy preferences 
than objectively it is. All these are possibilities.  
2.7. Symptoms of danger. Any data that show sta-
tistically significant correlations between percep-
tions of fact (risk, trust, and the like) on the one 
hand and background characteristics (age, sex, reli-
gion, politics) or goals (environmental, medical, 
economic, etc.) on the other hand, are likely to re-
flect feedback effects (reciprocal causation). Normal 
estimates from regression (OLS, multi-level models, 
etc.) are then biased. In particular, they are likely to 
exaggerate the influence of background and goals, 
as has long been known (Bollen, 1989). In short, 
such correlations are usually a sign of danger.  
Let us see what the reality is for attitudes toward 
genetic modification. 
3. Analysis Part 1: Demographic and religious 
influences 
Our model begins with potential causes that are 
stable individual characteristics, known to affect 
many attitudes and values: Age, sex, education, 
occupation, religion, politics and other background 
variables. Most are widely used in other studies of 
public opinion on biotechnology issues (Hossain et 
al., 2003; Hallman, 2000; Plutzer, Maney and 
O’Connor, 1998). We take them as fixed, causally 
prior to the other variables we consider here. Details 
are in the on-line Appendix. This assumption about 
causal order implies the existence of direct and indi-
rect effects; the logic of such effects is set out clear-
ly in many places (Alwin and Hauser, 1975; Bollen, 
1989; Kelley, 1973).  
For simplicity, we do not analyze the causal links 
among these variables (the subject of large litera-
tures in the Blau-Duncan paradigm, the sociology of 
religion, and social psychology, among others). 
Rather we treat them all as background factors po-
tentially shaping goals and knowledge relevant to 
genetic modification.  
Effects are estimated by structural equation (SEM) 
methods (Bollen, 1989; Joreskog and Sorbom 1993). 
Details are in the on-line Appendix (www.internatinal-
survey.org). 
3.1. Results: Demographic and religious effects, 
The main demographic and religious influences 
shaping the Australian public’s views of genetic 
engineering are shown in Figure 2. Conservatively, 
the model disregards small effects. It shows the total 
effects of demographic and background variables, 
regardless of whether they come about directly 
(rare) or indirectly through shaping people’s goals 
and perceptions of fact (usual). 
Demography
and religion: Policy preferences:
Age
Income
Male
For genetic modification 
in food and agriculture
Devout
Catholic
Parents church going
Parents' SES
Education
Occupation
Purple dashed: Religious elements
Grey dash double dot: Demographic
Legend:
Thin: Small positive effect
Thin: Small negative effect
Thick: Large positive effect (> +.10)
Thick: Large negative effect (< -.10)
Green solid italic: Rational, scientific
.12
 
Fig. 2. Total effects of demographic and religious variables on policy preferences about genetic modification in food and 
agriculture. Only statistically significant effects (at p < .01) with standardized effects greater than .05 are shown 
Demographic differences in age and gender have 
little impact on support for genetic engineering, as 
in other Australian studies (Owen and Louviere, 
2005) but unlike in Switzerland (Siegrist, 2000) and 
the US (Hossain et al., 2003). The only noticeable 
effect is that men are a little more likely than wom-
en to support genetic engineering. The total effect is 
.12 in standardized terms (Figure 2); the direct ef-
fect other things being equal is only .06 (shown in 
Figure 3 below) or more concretely, 2 points out of 
100. This comes about because men are more often 
adopt a scientific worldview and, for that reason, a 
little more likely to support genetic engineering. 
However, this is offset by their tendency to know 
more about genetic engineering, and therefore be 
fractionally less supportive of it.  
Other things being equal, old and young hardly dif-
fer: there is only a very small direct effect. Age does 
have some small indirect effects (shown later in 
Figure 3). Older people are more sympathetic to 
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agricultural goals, and so for that reason more sup-
portive of genetic engineering. However, they are 
also less likely to accept the scientific worldview, 
and for that reason less supportive of genetic engi-
neering. Taken together, these two offsetting effects 
leave older people just a fraction more supportive of 
genetic engineering: other things being equal, a 60 
year old is likely to be 2 points out of 100 more 
supportive than a 20 year old. 
Neither education nor occupation have any substan-
tial effect on attitudes to genetic engineering (Figure 
2). Other things being equal, well-educated people 
have no different views on genetic engineering than 
the poorly educated: there is no direct effect at all. 
Similar results have been found in other nations 
(Priest, 2000; Rundgren, 2011). 
Education does, however, have important indirect 
effects (Figure 3 below). The well-educated are far 
more knowledgeable about genetic engineering, and 
for that reason just a little less supportive. But the 
well-educated are also more likely to accept the 
scientific worldview, and for that reason are a little 
more supportive of genetic engineering. These two 
indirect effects almost exactly cancel each other out 
High status people are no different than people in low 
status occupations, either directly or indirectly: they 
have the same views on genetic engineering, the same 
goals for scientists, the same knowledge of genetic 
engineering, and are equally likely to hold the scientif-
ic worldview. Apparent differences between them are 
due to pre-existing educational differences. 
3.2. Analysis Part 2: Goals and knowledge. 3.3.1. 
Measurement. Many theories of decision-making 
hold that people judge the “means” by the “ends” 
(consequentialist reasoning): They are less con-
cerned with understanding mechanisms and risks 
involved in new technologies than with judging 
whether the technologies help attain valued goals 
(Gaskell et al., 2004; Hossain et al., 2003). One 
prominent goal is health and medicine (“New medi-
cines to cure serious diseases like cancer”).  
Another prominent goal is food quality and agri-
cultural productivity (“Tastier, fresher food; 
Cheaper food; Healthier, more nutritious foods; 
Crops that would create a new export market for 
Australian farmers”). Australia, like the USA and 
Argentina, has a thriving export industry subject to 
intense world-wide competition. Farmers are only a 
few percent of the population, but the general public 
is very sympathetic to their interests (e.g. Evans and 
Kelley, 2013) and willing to support policies to ben-
efit them, even at some personal cost. Agricultural 
subsidies are widely supported in the US and Eu-
rope on similar altruistic grounds, even though they 
result in higher prices for most supporters. 
Yet another important goal is protection of the 
environment (“How do you feel about... Protecting 
the environment?”).  
Knowledge of genetic engineering (“Before reading 
about it in this questionnaire, have you heard much 
about genetic engineering? Would you say you have 
a basic understanding of genetic enginee-ring?) is 
included because many theories of decision-making 
hold that people only form attitudes after they have 
acquired relevant information. Many regulators 
working in science-based regulatory regimes (like the 
US and Australia), and more practicing scientists, 
would expect that greater knowledge makes for sym-
pathy toward genetic engineering. But others would 
posit the opposite effect, and there are more complex 
possibilities as well (Jallinoja and Aro, 2000).  
Central to the scientific world view is acceptance of 
Darwin's theory of evolution – which implies that 
mankind is not unique but just one of millions of 
species shaped by natural forces – and acceptance of 
various aspects of modern astronomy that suggest 
our world is neither unique nor everlasting, but just 
one of many similar worlds elsewhere in the un-
iverse (Evans and Kelley, 2004). Adherence to the 
scientific worldview will, we argue, shape attitudes 
towards genetic engineering. People who reject the 
scientific worldview might be inclined to see genet-
ic engineering as tampering with divine creation, 
and hence immoral and possibly dangerous. 
3.2.2. Effects. Knowledge of genetic engineering. 
Interestingly, knowledge of genetic engineering has 
only a small impact on attitudes toward it: those 
who are more knowledgeable are fractionally less 
likely to approve, all other things equal. The effect 
is just -.06 in standardized terms (so small it is not 
even shown in Figure 3). Concretely, someone who 
is greatly interested in genetic engineering and feel 
themselves very knowledgeable about it would aver-
age 5 points out of 100 less supportive than someone 
with absolutely no interest and absolutely no know-
ledge. It may be that both effects posited by (oppos-
ing) information-base decision theorists are real: 
increases in knowledge lead some people to be more 
supportive of genetic engineering, but lead other 
people to be less supportive, and the two effects al-
most cancel each other out (Jallinoja and Aro, 2000). 
Other studies have also found few effects of know-
ledge, although sometimes tending to increase sup-
port for genetic engineering (e.g. Dawson and Schi-
beci, 2003; Hossain, 2003; Priest, 2000). Knowledge 
and opinion expressed by the press, judging from US 
research, do not appear to be influential either (Eyck, 
2005).  
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Fig. 3. Effects of goals and knowledge on policy preferences for genetic modification in food and agriculture 
3.2.3. Scientific worldview. Acceptance of a scientif-
ic worldview in which mankind is not unique but just 
one of millions of species evolved over the millennia 
by natural selection, living in a world like countless 
others in an unimaginably vast and changing un-
iverse, leads people to take a more relaxed attitude to 
changing species by genetic engineering. If our world 
is not the culmination of a divine plan, or the unique 
exemplar of life in an arid universe, changing it to 
suit our interests seems reasonable. The impact is not 
large, but neither it is small, a standardized effect 
of .12. In concrete terms, the difference between 
someone who whole-heartedly accepts evolution and 
modern astronomy and one of the (surprisingly large) 
number of people who unequivocally reject them is, 
other things being equal, a difference of 11 points out 
of 100 in support for genetic engineering. So far as I 
know, this important effect has not previously been 
documented in the literature. 
Religious belief itself has no direct connection to ap-
proval of genetic engineering, despite much specula-
tion to the contrary and its demonstrated importance in 
other areas of biotechnology (Evans and Kelley, 
2011). But most people with strong Christian beliefs 
reject the scientific worldview, which thereby indirect-
ly reduces their support for genetic modification. In 
concrete terms, the difference between a devout Chris-
tian and an uncompromising atheist is 3 points out of 
100, other things being equal. The absence of a direct 
effect of religious belief, net of acceptance/rejection of 
the scientific worldview, has also been found for atti-
tudes about conventional organ transplants (Evans and 
Kelley, 2014.) 
Surprisingly, Catholics are slightly more likely to 
accept the scientific worldview than are equally 
devout members of other denominations. As a con-
sequence, they just fractionally are more likely to 
support genetic engineering, by half a point out of 
100, other things being equal. 
3.2.4. Goals. Much the most important factor is that 
people who value goals that genetic engineering 
serves are much more supportive of it (Figure 3). 
People who warmly endorse agricultural and food 
goals – fresher, cheaper, healthier food, increased 
earnings and new export markets for farmers – are 
very favorable towards genetic engineering, other 
things being equal. This is by far the largest influ-
ence we have discovered, with a standardized effect 
of fully .53. Concretely, someone who was absolute-
ly “delighted” with all these benefits would on aver-
age be 38 points out of 100 more supportive of ge-
netic engineering than someone who thought all 
these goals “terrible”. Of course, few people actual-
ly think these goals are “terrible”. But even if we 
confine the comparison to those who are merely 
indifferent to them1, the difference is fully 19 points. 
The great importance of goals has been found in 
other research using quite different methods (Owen 
and Louviere, 2005). 
People who greatly value health goals for science – 
specifically, new medicines to cure serious diseases 
like cancer – are also more favorable towards gene-
                                                     
1 That is those who give them neutral scores half way between “de-
lighted” and “terrible”. 
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tic engineering. This is the second largest effect that 
we have found, with a standardized effect of .18. 
Concretely, someone who was absolutely “de-
lighted” with the prospect of new medicines would 
on average be 17 points out of 100 more supportive 
of genetic engineering than someone who was indif-
ferent to them1. 
Of course, medical progress is highly popular in 
Australia, 95 points out of 100, as it is in Europe 
and the USA2. Support for improvements in food 
quality and for financial benefits to farmers is also 
widespread in Australia – over 80 points out of 100. 
The widespread support for agricultural subsidies in 
Europe and the USA suggests such views are wide-
spread there as well; certainly, genetically engi-
neered improvements in agricultural production are 
widely supported in many nations (Gaskell et al., 
1999; Hoban and Kendall, 1992; Lemkow 1993; 
Optima 1994; U.S. Congress, 1987).  
3.2.5. In all. The strong support for agricultural and 
medical progress is probably the reason that most 
Australians support genetic engineering rather than 
being indifferent to it3: 
♦ Imagine, hypothetically, a world where nothing 
has changed except that Australians are indiffe-
rent to agricultural and medical goals, rating 
them a neutral 50 points out of 100. In such a 
world, our model implies that the level of sup-
port for genetic engineering would be just 48 
points out of 100, just on the negative side of 
“mixed feelings”. Thus a majority of Australi-
ans would be indifferent to genetic engineering, 
or opposed to it, in this hypothetical world.  
♦ Similarly, in a world where nothing has changed 
except that support for the scientific worldview 
completely disappeared, public support for ge-
netic engineering would remain high, 69 points 
out of 100.  
♦ Nor does knowledge of genetic engineering make 
much difference to the big picture. In a hypothet-
ical world where nothing has changed except that 
the public knows nothing at all of the science un-
derlying genetic engineering, support would still 
be high, 79 points. And alternatively, if everyone 
thought themselves fully informed about the 
                                                     
1 In concrete terms, support for medical goals is almost as important as 
support for agricultural goals, but in standardized terms it is just half as 
important. The smaller standardized effect is because there is less 
variation in support for medical goals, which are almost universally 
endorsed, than in support for agricultural goals, about which a signifi-
cant minority have reservations. 
2 This popularity is probably the key cause of the enormous biomedical 
research budgets in the developed world.  
3 These calculations are based on the preferred model, specifically the 
metric structural equation results in the last two columns of Table 3. It 
assumes that everything remains as before, except for the changes 
explicitly mentioned.  
science, support would be only a little lower ac-
cording to our model, 74 points. 
Thus the most important source of Australian opi-
nion about genetic engineering is not to be found in 
the scientific worldview, although the scientifically 
inclined are more supportive; nor it is to be found in 
knowledge of the science, although that matters too; 
nor it is to be found in religion, demography or 
class. Rather it is to be found in the goals to be pur-
sued: medical progress, better food and prosperity 
for farmers.  
This is substantial support for goal-oriented “conse-
quentialist” model of moral reasoning (green solid 
italic arrows in Figure 3), a model of moral reason-
ing widely held by scientists, economists, and policy 
analysts. It is also something we suspect is generally 
important in evaluating technology and other intrin-
sically neutral processes with morally important 
outcomes. 
3.3. Analysis Part 3: Perceptions of fact, rational 
choice, and emotions. 3.3.1. Measurement. Cost-
benefit calculations try to balance potential gains 
with the potential risks (“That medical genetic engi-
neering could accidentally create a new disease? 
That genetically engineered plants might get out of 
hand and spread on their own? That genetically 
engineered food plants might be a long run danger 
to human health?”) Such risks form the focus of 
much regulatory consideration (Falck-Zepeda and 
Zambrano, 2011), but are difficult to measure relia-
bly (Pidgeon, Kasperson and Slovic, 2003).  
Trust (“In deciding if it is safe enough for you and 
your family, who would you believe...The Com-
monwealth government committee set up to regulate 
genetic engineering? A committee of university 
scientists? A committee of medical doctors. CSIRO – 
the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Re-
search Organization?”) is also likely to be impor-
tant, both directly (Brewer and Ley, 2013) and indi-
rectly through its major influence on perceptions of 
risk (Poortinga and Pidgeon, 2004)4. Trust is a key 
mechanism through which authoritative moral rea-
soning works: Those who hold scientists trustworthy 
are likely to endorse the policies they perceive the 
scientists as endorsing, in this case agricultural ge-
netic modification. 
3.2.2. Estimates. Trust in scientist’s veracity about 
GM is important influence on acceptance of GM 
policy, about three-quarters as important as accept-
                                                     
4 Perceptions of risk and trust are little correlated with evaluation of 
goals or other variables in the present model and their effects are addi-
tive. Thus including them, although it increases the variance explained, 
leaves other effects virtually unchanged. 
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ing food and agricultural goals (Figure 4). So it is a 
big story, if this result is to be believed. 
Risk raises complex and important issues. Fear of 
risks from GM agriculture is an equally important 
influence on acceptance of GM policy, again about 
three-quarters as important as accepting the food 
and agricultural goals. 
Demography
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Fig. 4. Effects of perception of fact (concerning how trustworthy scientists are about GM and how risky GM food is) on 
policy preferences for genetically modified food and agriculture. Simple recursive model without reciprocal causation. For 
simplicity, effects of demographic and religious variables, which are few and small, are not shown 
Trust and fear are not closely correlated – nor should 
they be, as both are perceptions of fact, at least on the 
face of things, and so should be uncorrelated.  
Since they are facts, they might reasonably be more 
accepted by educated folk, or by those knowledge-
able about GM, or by those who already accept the 
scientific worldview. But not much in fact: there is 
only a little link from the scientific worldview. 
Emotional/psychological (as opposed to logi-
cal/rational) influences also exist (links in red). 
Since the trustworthiness of scientists and the risks of 
genetic modification are facts, they should not be 
influenced by wishful thinking – just because you 
favor better food and more prosperity for farmers is 
no logical or rational reason to think scientists are 
truthful when they say genetic engineering is safe 
(alignment would be comfortable, but agreeing with 
your predispositions does not make, nor break, a 
scientific truth). Similarly, wanting better food and 
richer farmers is no logical/rational reason for assess-
ing the risks of genetic modification to be small. 
Similarly, accepting environmental goals is no good 
scientific/logical/rational reason for finding scien-
tists untruthful about GM, or for finding that GM is 
risky. All that fits your prejudices, but disagreeing 
with your prejudices is no logical/rational evidence 
of lying. 
Nonetheless all this does happen, and to a substan-
tial degree (red dash-dot arrows in Figure 4): people 
seem to let their preferences and desires shape their 
perception of facts. They see the world as consistent 
with their hopes (for food and farmers) and with 
their fears (for the environment). Those who hope 
for better food and richer farmers see the world 
through rosy glasses, while those who fear for the 
environment see gloom and doom.  
Thus, there are substantial elements of emotion, of 
wishful thinking, of irrational hopes and fears in-
volved in assessing how much scientists are to be 
trusted to say the truth, and in assessing risks of 
genetic engineering (links in red dash-dot). This is 
the psychological force of cognitive bal-
ance/alignment, not rationality.  
4. Analysis Part 4: Reciprocal effects  
Since there seem to be substantial elements of wishful 
thinking, of irrational hopes and fears shaping people’s 
view of the world, there is a further possibility: that 
peoples’ views about genetic modification shape their 
perceptions of fact – that wishful thinking leads sup-
Environmental Economics, Volume 5, Issue 4, 2014 
 91 
porters of GM to imagine scientists to be trustworthy 
when they say (as they mostly do) that GM is safe, and 
to think that the risks of GM are few. Conversely, that 
opponents of GM therefore make the world fit their 
gloomy predispositions by seeing scientists as un-
trustworthy and risks as large.  
If this is so, then there is an emotional/psychological 
(as opposed to logical/rational) connection from 
policy preferences shaping perceptions of trust in 
scientists (red dash-dot path C in Figure 5), as well 
as the logical/rational effect the other way, where 
trust in scientists assurances of safety leads to sup-
port for genetically modified food and crops (green 
solid italic path B). In short, reciprocal effects. 
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Fig. 5. Effects of perceptions of fact (concerning how trustworthy scientists are about GM and how risky GM food is) on 
policy preferences for genetically modified food and agriculture. Model with reciprocal causation (paths C and F). For sim-
plicity, effects of demographic and religious variables, which are few and small, are not shown here (they are in Table 3) 
Moreover, the same logic implies that there is an 
emotional/psychological (as opposed to logi-
cal/rational) connection from policy preferences 
which shapes perceptions of risk (red dash-dot path 
F in Figure 5), as well as the logical/rational effect 
the other way (green solid italic path E). So more 
reciprocal effects. 
Estimating reciprocal effects persuasively is fa-
mously problematic since the logic must be de-
fended only theoretically – there is rarely any empir-
ical evidence that would rule out other assumptions 
(Bollen, 1989). Here I argue that we do, theoretical-
ly, have some reasonable leverage. (1) We know 
that accepting the goals of better food and prosper-
ous farmers leads people to trust scientists’ (general-
ly favorable) pronouncements about GM, and as-
sume that this is on psychological as opposed to 
logical/rational grounds (red path C* in Figure 4). 
So it seems likely that the corresponding psycholog-
ical effect leading those who favor GM also to trust 
scientists should be about the same size (red dash-
dot path C). So we assume that C = C* (i.e. that the 
metric effects are the same size). That is sufficient 
to identify the reciprocal path (green solid italic path 
B). (2) Analogously, we know that people who ac-
cept goals of better food and prosperous farmers are 
less fearful of the risks GM food brings, presumably 
on psychological as opposed to logical/rational 
grounds (red dash-dot path F* in Figure 5). It thus 
seems likely that the psychological tendency for 
those who accept the policy of genetic modification 
will also tend on psychological grounds equally to 
be less fearful of the risks (red dash-dot path F). So 
we assume that F = F*. This is sufficient to identify 
the reciprocal effect (green solid italic path E).  
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All this is problematic but, we suggest, not wholly 
implausible. Certainly it is more plausible than the 
assumption (maintained in Figure 4) that there are 
substantial psychological effects from goals to trust, 
but not from policy preferences to trust, and that 
there are psychological effects from goals to fear, 
but not from policy preferences to fear. We suspect 
that the estimates in Figure 5 with reciprocal causa-
tion, while admittedly problematic, are closer to the 
truth than the estimates of Figure 4, a conventional 
recursive model without any reciprocal effects. 
These results, if accepted, have important implica-
tions. First, they imply that a conventional estimate of 
trust’s effect on acceptance of GM policies (green 
solid italic path B) overstates trust’s importance sub-
stantially, by around 30% (compare its effects in Fi-
gures 4 and 5). 
Second and analogously, a conventional estimate of 
fear’s effect on policy preferences (green solid italic 
path E) overstates its effects as well, by about 20% 
(again compare Figures 4 and 5). In both cases the 
observed correlation reflects substantial emotion-
al/psychological adjustments as well as convention-
al rational/logical influences. 
Third, after allowance is made for reciprocal effects, 
the effect of acceptance of food and agricultural goals 
on acceptance of the GM policy – the means to fulfill 
the goals (green solid italic path A) – is even more 
dominant. Its magnitude, fully .44 in standardized 
terms, is huge in absolute terms and in comparison 
with other influences: more than twice as large as 
trust’s effect (path A versus path B) and more than 
twice as large as risk’s effects (path A versus path F).  
Fourth, much of the debate about trust in scientists and 
about the risks of GM is not based on logical/rational 
considerations (green solid italic paths in Figure 5) but 
reflects psychological processes of people adjusting 
their perceptions of fact to suit their goals and policy 
predispositions (red dash-dot paths). In short, emotion 
and psychology rather than science. 
Conclusion 
The Australian public, like the American, is broadly 
supportive of a wide range of genetic engineering 
projects. The average Australian rates the average 
genetic engineering project as a “good idea”. In gener-
al, views about genetic engineering in Australia are 
broadly similar to those in the USA, Canada and some 
of the more favorable European Union nations.  
Importantly, the level of support depends crucially on 
the goals served. Of the genetic engineering products 
we asked about in the survey, the most popular are a 
treatment for blood cancer, a drug that lowers blood 
pressure, and cotton that resists insect pests. More than 
90% of Australians favor these. Then comes healthier 
cooking oil, genetically modified viruses to protect 
farm crops by attacking insect pests, viruses to control 
imported animal pests, and lean pork. Support is low-
est for the genetically engineered tomato but even here 
a clear majority is in favor.  
People who favor genetic engineering tend to be 
those who favor the goals, especially agricultural 
benefits, and those who have a scientific worldview. 
Conversely, against genetic modification – the mi-
nority – tend to be those who are less keen on agri-
cultural goals than most Australians, less keen on 
new medicines, and who reject Darwin’s theory of 
evolution and modern astronomy. 
These Australian results have implications for pub-
lic opinion in other Western nations:  
♦ Like people everywhere, Australians are very 
strongly in favor of scientific research in medi-
cine. For that reason, they tend to support genet-
ic engineering in medical domains, and that is 
likely to be true for people in other Western na-
tions as well. Genetically engineered medicines 
are therefore likely to come increasingly into 
favor in the future.  
♦ Australians are also very strongly in favor of 
many agricultural goals, particularly crops that 
would create an export market and ones that 
provide healthier food, but also ones that would 
increase farmers’ incomes, provide cheaper 
food, or provide tastier food. These are again 
views that are likely to be mirrored in other 
countries, particularly food-exporting ones like 
the USA, although probably less so in the Euro-
pean Union with its huge food surplus. This will 
lead to steady pressure for the introduction of 
genetically modified farm products.  
♦ A majority of Australians accept what we have 
called the ‘scientific worldview’ – Darwin’s 
theory of evolution and modern astronomy (the 
‘big bang’ and the like), although many others, 
especially devout Christians, reject it. Accep-
tance of the scientific worldview is an important 
source of support for genetic engineering. This 
source of support is likely to salient in irreli-
gious nations (including Scandinavia and much 
of Northern Europe) but lead to opposition in 
more religious ones. But it will also create a po-
tentially troublesome gap between opinion 
among the scientific elite – which overwhel-
mingly accepts evolution and scientific astron-
omy – and more religious politicians and the 
general public.  
How these attitudes will evolve in future years is 
unclear. The scientific worldview might become 
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more widespread (which would increase support for 
genetic engineering) or fade (which would lead to 
decreased support for genetic engineering), but it 
has been stable over recent decades, so major 
changes seem unlikely.  
The most important sources of support for genetic 
engineering are support for its instrumental goals: 
medical progress, healthy food and prosperous far-
mers. Support for medical research is very high and, 
with a prosperous but ageing population, likely to 
remain so. Diet is notoriously subject to fad, and so 
hard to predict. Farm prosperity is a surprisingly 
highly valued goal in Australia – as in some Euro-
pean nations and the USA – and that holds even 
among urban populations who pay heavily for their 
sympathy through farm subsides and higher food 
pries. But it is perhaps the most likely source of 
change. The huge subsidies given to the developed 
world’s farmers and the high prices due to those and 
to other farm protection measures may eventually 
erode public sympathy for farmers. If so, there is 
likely to be an unexpected consequence: a sharp 
decline in public support for genetic engineering.  
Symptoms of danger in the structure of public 
opinion. Many analyses of public opinion about 
genetic engineering emphasize the importance of 
trust and evaluations of risk. So do many analyses of 
other public policy issues. Simplistic analyses usual-
ly suggest that both are important. But our results 
strongly suggest their apparent importance is exag-
gerated: much of the debate about trust in scientists 
and about the risks of GM is not based on logical or 
rational considerations. Instead it also reflects emo-
tional and psychological processes of people adjust-
ting their perceptions of fact to suit their goals and 
policy predispositions (the dangerous red arrows in 
our theory diagrams). In short, emotion rather than 
science.That is a risk best avoided. 
Supplementary materials on-line at:  www.inter- 
national-survey.org. 
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